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Abstract: Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) are state-sponsored actors who break into computer networks
for political or industrial espionage. Because of the nature of cyberspace and ever-changing sophisticated
attack techniques, it is challenging to prevent and detect APT attacks. 2020 United States Federal Government
data breach once again showed how difficult to protect networks from targeted attacks. Among many other
solutions and techniques, zero trust is a promising security architecture that might effectively prevent the
intrusion attempts of APT actors. In the zero trust model, no process insider or outside the network is trusted
by default. Zero trust is also called perimeterless security to indicate that it changes the focus from network
devices to assets. All processes are required to verify themselves to access the resources. In this paper, we
focused on APT prevention. We sought an answer to the question: "could the 2020 United States Federal
Government data breach have been prevented if the attacked networks used zero trust architecture?" To
answer this question, we used MITRE's ATT&CK® framework to extract how the APT29 threat group techniques
could be mitigated to prevent initial access to federal networks. Secondly, we listed basic constructs of the
zero trust model using NIST Special Publication 800-207 and several other academic and industry resources.
Finally, we analyzed how zero trust can prevent malicious APT activities. We found that zero trust has a strong
potential of preventing APT attacks or mitigating them significantly. We also suggested that vulnerability
scanning, application developer guidance, and training should not be neglected in zero trust implementations
as they are not explicitly or strongly mentioned in NIST SP 800-207 and are among the mostly referred controls
in academic and industry publications.
Keywords: Zero Trust, Zero Trust Architecture, ZTA, NIST SP 800-207, MITRE ATT&CK, Advanced Persistent
Threats, APT, APT29, SolarWinds Orion Breach
1. Introduction
On December 13, 2020, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the federal body responsible
for managing the cybersecurity of critical sectors in the US, released an emergency directive (CISA, 2020). The
directive was the announcement of the worst cyber-espionage incident ever suffered by the US because of the
long duration and the sensitivity and high profile of the targets (Wikipedia, 2021a). If printed, the amount of
data stolen would form a stack far taller than the Washington Monument (Bajak, 2020). It was probably one of
the most organized cyber-espionage campaigns and the biggest cyber-raid against the US in years. The breach
has been named in various names, including SolarWinds Orion Breach, SolarWinds Orion Software Supply
Chain Breach, or 2020 United States Federal Government Data Breach.
Many federal organizations in the US were affected by this security incident, such as eleven Departments,
including State, Defense, Treasury, Energy, Homeland Security, and Justice. US federal government was not the
only victim. There are other Governments, Fortune 500 companies, International Organizations. For example,
the British government, NATO, European parliament, and Microsoft were among the victims (Harding and
Sabbagh, 2020). SolarWinds announced that it sent an advisory to about 33,000 of its customers around the
globe who might have been affected, and roughly 18,000 customers had installed the compromised product
(Cimpanu, 2020).
In this modern trojan horse story, cyber attackers turned SolarWinds Orion software into a trojan horse by
injecting malicious code. To do that, they penetrated Solarwind’s update server by obtaining the easy-to-guess
password of the server and injected malware into Orion’s update packages. SolarWinds was not the only
exploited product; the attackers also exploited software or credentials from Microsoft and VMware.
Attackers started their malicious activities in September 2019. They spent roughly six months on
reconnaissance and resource development before initiating the attack. During this time, they created their
proof-of-concepts codes, developed a command-and-control system that would allow them to connect victim
networks, send commands, and download data. They sneaked their code to the SolarWinds update server as
early as March 2020; this is also considered the start day of penetrating federal networks in the US. It has been
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passed roughly nine months between the initial access of the attackers and the announcement of the breach
by CISA. Eventually, the malicious activities span a timeline of fifteen months.
The cybersecurity advisory released by the United States holds "Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
actors" responsible for compromising SolarWinds Orion software update packages (NSA, CISA and FBI, 2021).
The advisory specifically mentioned the names of three APT groups: APT29, Cozy Bear, and the Dukes.
When it comes to the information on the activities of these threat groups, the MITRE ATT&CK webpage helps
security researchers and companies a lot. “MITRE ATT&CK is a knowledge base of cyber adversary behavior
and taxonomy for adversarial actions across their lifecycle” (MITRE, 2021b). The tactics and techniques used by
the APT29 group have been listed and analyzed on the MITRE ATT&CK webpage. Among the information listed
for APT29, there are tools used by the group, procedures -specific implementations of techniques-, associated
groups. ATT&CK framework shows Cozy Bear and The Dukes as associated groups with APT29. According to
MITRE ATT&CK, APT29 uses more than 80 attack techniques spread into ten different tactics across the
adversarial lifecycle. MITRE ATT&CK knowledge base is a community-supported and free-to-use threat
intelligence database that can help detect malicious activities and attribute them to the threat groups.
Detection of cyber threats is essential in network defense; prevention is the first step, though. Cyber
defenders, including the industry, non-profit organizations, government agencies, and academia, have been
working on new services, software, models, tools, and architectures to prevent the attacks at their earliest
phases. Zero trust network architecture is a coordinated cybersecurity and system management strategy that
combines many existing cybersecurity solutions and paradigms with a different security mindset (NSA, 2021).
Zero trust is not a siloed or isolated security application; instead, it is a model that changes the approaches to
the trust concept in networks. In the zero trust model, the trust is removed from the network and systems; so
that no process (user, computer, device) is trusted by default regardless of its network location and ownership
(Rose et al., 2020). Zero trust is also called perimeterless security to indicate the fact that it changes the focus
from network devices to data and enterprise resources, and all processes are required to verify themselves to
access the resources (Wikipedia, 2021b). Zero trust has been adapted by some enterprises, introduced by
security vendors in their services and product portfolio, proposed by academia, and recently formalized by the
US government by NIST Special Publication 800-207. Zero trust architecture can be very effective in preventing
APT attacks and reducing the impact of sophisticated attacks considerably.
In this article, we reviewed the literature and MITRE ATT&CK database to answer the following questions:
1. Could the 2020 United States Federal Government Data Breach caused by SolarWinds Orion and other
vendor vulnerabilities have been prevented if the attacked networks used zero trust architecture?
2. If not, what other controls would have been required to prevent the breach in federal networks?
The article's goal is to provide insights into the effectiveness of Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) to prevent APT
attacks. For that purpose, we reviewed four techniques and five sub-techniques used by the APT29 group to
gain initial access to networks (MITRE, 2021a). We also reviewed NIST Special Publication 800-207 and
academic resources to extract the main constructs of ZTA. Finally, we discussed the effectiveness of ZTA
constructs in preventing the techniques and sub-techniques of the APT29 group and answered two research
questions above.
The paper has four sections. The first section is the introduction. The second section is reserved for the
literature review. The third section is the part of the article where we answer the research questions. The
fourth section is dedicated to future studies and conclusions.
2. Literature Review
This section is grouped into three subsections. The first subsection is dedicated to the methods and tools to
prevent APTs. The second subsection is reserved for the MITRE ATT&CK summary. The third subsection gives
coverage to the literature about ZTA.
2.1 APT Prevention
As research questions imply, APT detection is not within the scope of this article. Therefore, the literature
review on APT is limited to prevention.
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It would not be wrong to say that most academic papers about APTs discuss detection methods instead of
prevention methods. Vulnerabilities are inevitable. State-sponsored cyber actors are targeted groups and have
been using sophisticated techniques. As an expected consequence of these facts, APT groups frequently
compromise networks and systems (Karabacak and Tatar, 2014). As a matter of fact, successful APT attacks are
assumed to be successful no matter when. The incapability of prevention methods by nature might be the root
reason behind the high proportion of APT detection papers (Tatar, Karabacak and Gheorghe, 2016). Cole also
assumes the prevention failure in his book and says, "Prevention is ideal, but detection is a must" (Cole, 2013).
Cole emphasizes the importance of both prevention and detection in fighting against APTs. According to Cole,
companies usually forget about prevention and focus on detection.
On the other hand, the reverse is also true when looking at the long time spans of incidents; companies invest
in prevention and show minimal effort on detection (Cole, 2013). The recent breach statistics confirm that
millions of records have been stolen from organizations unnoticed for months, even years. Cole emphasizes
the importance of augmentation of traditional prevention technologies with additional technologies. The
author lists three traditional prevention technologies: firewall, Intrusion Prevention System (IPS), and Data
Loss Prevention (DLP). For the augmentation of the firewall, he proposes adding internal firewalls from
different vendors in addition to perimeter firewalls and using host-based firewalls. IPS augmentation steps are
minimizing false positives and tuning to detect the indicators of APTs. DLPs can be augmented by tying with a
Digital Rights Management solution. Finally, Cole indicates that these foundational technologies will not be
sufficient to stop APTs.
Moon et al. propose a multi-layer defense system to prevent and detect APTs (Moon et al., 2014). The defense
system collects and analyzes log information from endpoints and processes the information with the help of
eight components. The authors share two cases for the prevention: infection through USB and spear phishing.
The proposed defense system might effectively prevent some specific cyberattacks; however, it cannot be
applied to all circumstances. Mohamed et al. stress two crucial social aspects to prevent APT attacks: security
awareness and information security policies (Mohamed, Jantan and Abiodun, 2018). They propose an
enhancement to the MITRE ATT&CK Mitigations for a specific incident caused by malware infection. They
propose automatic termination of the connection between the victim and attacker. Their proposed solution is
not comprehensive and mature in mitigating a diverse set of APT tactics and techniques. Messaoud et al.
provide a list of technologies to protect against APT actors. Those technologies are sandboxing, honeypots,
SIEM, and user behavior analytics (Messaoud et al., 2016). They map these technologies with different attack
phases of APT actors in their lifecycle using a matrix. According to the proposed matrix, all these technologies
are effective in preventing APT attacks; however, they don't share insights into the possible limitations of
these four technologies in preventing APT attacks. Adelaiye et al. review the literature and highlights 12 APT
mitigation techniques proposed by 25 researchers (Adelaiye, Ajibola and Faki, 2019). Authors emphasize
traffic/data analysis, pattern recognition, and anomaly detection as promising APT mitigation methods. The
emphasized methods are all detective controls. There are some prevention methods among the 12 highlighted
techniques, which are whitelists, blacklists, IDS, awareness, deception, risk assessment, and multi-layer
security. Liu proposes a network security architecture for APT detection and prevention (Liu, 2014). The author
focuses on the detection part and proposes a centralized analysis and control module. For the prevention part,
they suggest using a firewall and IPS. Jeun et al. categorize the preventive countermeasures for APTs into two;
technical and managerial countermeasures. Security tools -firewall, IPS, antivirus-, using authentic software,
DLP, encryption, and network separation are listed as technical; risk management, security education, and
access control are listed as managerial countermeasures (Jeun, Lee and Won, 2012). Zulkefli et al. propose
Multi-Level Security – Access Control framework to prevent APT in BYOD environment (Zulkefli, Singh and
Malim, 2015). The proposed model has six layers; outside, mobile component, authentication, authorization,
accounting, and security policies. The proposed solutions emphasize the importance of user awareness and
robust policy infrastructure for effective prevention.
In addition to recommendations and solutions proposed by academia, security vendors continuously improve
their product portfolio that help prevent APT attacks directly or indirectly. Firewall, antivirus, IPS, web
application firewall, web & email protection, and sandboxing are among the most common products to
prevent APT attacks (Hudson, 2014).
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2.2 MITRE ATT&CK
MITRE ATT&CK is a publicly available threat intelligence database that groups the techniques used by cyber
actors into 14 tactics sorted by the lifecycle of an attack (MITRE, 2021b). It is based on real-world observations.
ATT&CK framework categorizes adversarial behavior into two broad classes; Enterprise and Mobile. There are
customized ATT&CK matrices that fall into these two classes. When this article has been prepared, there are
11 matrices for enterprise networks and two matrices for mobile. There is also one matrix for industrial control
systems. In addition to ATT&CK matrices that include all documented tactics and techniques for enterprise
networks and mobile platforms, MITRE ATT&CK Navigator shows specific techniques used by a threat group.
For this article, the authors reviewed six initial access techniques of the APT29 threat group after switching to
the MITRE ATT&CK Navigator of the group. Tactics and techniques are the building stones of the framework.
Techniques are listed under tactics; there are 188 Techniques, 379 Sub-techniques grouped under 14 tactics.
“Techniques represent “how” an adversary achieves a tactical goal by performing an action. Tactics represent
the “why” of an ATT&CK technique or sub-technique; they are the reason for performing an action. Subtechniques are a more specific description of the adversarial behavior used to achieve a goal. They describe
behavior at a lower level than a technique (MITRE, 2021b).” ATT&CK website shares other cyberthreat
information such as threat groups and tools used by threat groups. The latest version of the ATT&CK (v10)
provides detailed information about 129 threat groups and 637 pieces of software used in cyber-attacks.
There are many use cases that ATT&CK can be utilized. For example, it can be used
1.
2.
3.
4.

by defense teams to detect cyber threats
to model threats and perform comparable and structural threat intelligence
by red teams to emulate cyber threats
by security architects and engineers to assess the current security posture and redesign the security
architecture.

As an example of the fourth use case, the MITRE organization shares the details of a behavioral-based threat
model based on MITRE ATT&CK to perform validation of security products (Strom et al., 2017). Several
academic studies propose original security methods and models using the ATT&CK framework—the proposed
methods and models by academia map to one of four use cases listed above. For example, Outkin et al.
present a game-theoretic method that uses the MITRE ATTA&CK APT3 threat data to model attacker-defender
interaction and enhance the defender strategies (Outkin et al., 2021). Manocha et al. propose a security
assessment rating framework using ATTA&CK (Manocha et al., 2021). Pell et al. study a dynamic threat
modeling for 5G networks using ATTA&CK (Pell et al., 2021). Choi et al. show how ATT&CK can be used to
generate random attack sequences against ICS datasets (Choi, Yun and Min, 2021). Georgiadou et al. evaluate
organizational/individual security culture and security vulnerabilities together and map them to adversaries
using ATT&CK to develop a cybersecurity culture framework (Georgiadou, Mouzakitis and Askounis, 2021).
Xiong et al. propose a new threat modeling language for enterprise security based on the ATT&CK enterprise
matrix (Xiong et al., 2021).
The flexibility and open nature of ATT&CK attract the attention of enterprises and security vendors.
Enterprises use the database to improve their security capabilities. Security product vendors actively use
ATT&CK to enhance their product features and libraries and map their functionalities to the adversary
techniques.
2.3 Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA)
“Zero trust is a cybersecurity paradigm focused on resource protection and the premise that trust is never
granted implicitly but must be continually evaluated” (Rose et al., 2020). In the zero trust model, no process
insider or outside the network is trusted by default. Zero trust is also called perimeterless security to indicate
that it changes the focus from networks, network devices, and perimeters to data and enterprise resources; all
entities must verify themselves to access the resources. Some vendors develop zero-trust platforms, whereas
some use zero-trust principles to improve their existing security solutions. Colortokens is one of the vendors
that developed a zero-trust platform, and they explain how their platform helps stop APT threats (Nayak,
2021). A number of vendors have been preparing guidance documents to provide general information about
ZTA and how their products adapt to the architecture (Chowdhury, 2019; Banach, 2021; Checkpoint, 2021;
Colortokens, 2021; Splunk, 2021; VMware, 2022).
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There are not so many academic studies that analyze the effectiveness and capabilities of ZTA in preventing
APT attacks. Alevizos et al. claim that authenticated and authorized endpoints can be considered weak points
in networks adopting ZTA so that APTs can perform malicious activities through these endpoints. They suggest
using blockchain to verify the integrity of endpoints in a ZTA (Alevizos, Ta and Hashem Eiza, 2021). Horne and
Nair claim that ZTA is a realistic security model to battle modern threats, including APTs (Horne and Nair,
2021). Although it is not an academic work, Van Driel provides an overview of how zero trust frustrates APT
actors in his blog post (Van Driel, 2015).
Academic studies on ZTA have proposed solutions for specific cybersecurity and technology cases that do not
directly touch APT prevention. Collier and Sarkis compare zero trust concepts and current supply chain
concepts (Collier and Sarkis, 2021). They discuss the application of zero trust for more secure supply chains.
Zaheer et al. propose eZTrust for microservices, a network-independent perimeterization approach using zero
trust concepts (Zaheer et al., 2019). One of the use cases for eZTrust is to deploy contingency policies that
block the traffic to vulnerable applications. Tao et al. propose a method to perform security controls on big
data (Tao, Lei and Ruxiang, 2018). They base their method on zero trust; the first phase of their three-phased
approach is user context recognition based on zero trust. Chen et al. propose a security protection framework
for power mobile Internet services using zero trust (Chen et al., 2021). Mehraj and Banday propose a zerotrust strategy for the cloud environment (Mehraj and Banday, 2020). The strategy is in the conceptual design
phase and is based on choosing trustworthy entities in the cloud environment. De Silva et al. propose a
mathematical model for a zero-aware smart home system based on continuous authentication and contextaware access control; both are based on zero trust (da Silva, Macedo and dos Santos, 2021). Vanickis et al.
propose a risk-based access control framework for zero trust networks and define the policy languages -such
as firewall access control policies- to support the framework (Vanickis et al., 2018).
Trust itself is a vulnerability, and zero trust is a systemic approach to patch this vulnerability (Campbell, 2020).
Zero trust might be very efficient in preventing today’s sophisticated cyber attackers when implemented
adequately by organizations. Academia collaboratively and continuously researches zero trust and proposes
conceptual or technical solutions for various cases and systems, including cloud environments, smart homes,
supply chains, big data, microservices, and power mobile internet services. Industry adapts itself very well to
ZTA; they develop new services and products and share white papers with their partners and customers.
2.4 The Gap in the Literature
There are quite a few academic studies that bring the ZTA and APT concepts together. One of those studies
proposes a ZTA and blockchain-based solution that focuses on preventing APTs (Alevizos, Ta and Hashem Eiza,
2021). To the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that research the effectiveness of ZTA in preventing
APT attacks.
3. The Analysis of the Effectiveness of Zero Trust in Preventing APTs
In the next section, we analyze the effectiveness of ZTA in preventing APT actors. First, we use MITRE ATT&CK
to extract and review the initial access techniques and sub-techniques of the APT29 group. Second, we use the
literature and NIST SP 800-207 to extract the main building blocks of zero trust. Third, we analyze the
effectiveness of ZTA in preventing the APT29 techniques.
We have several delimitations and limitations. First, we delimit our review to the 2020 United States Federal
Government Breach. In this regard, we review the attack techniques of the APT29 group, as that group was
one of the main actors of the government breach (NSA, CISA and FBI, 2021). The amount of information about
APT actors is limited. MITRE ATT&CK provides the most comprehensive information about the techniques and
tools used by APT actors. We used MITRE ATT&CK as the only source of information for APT29 techniques.
APT29 group might be using more techniques than provided by the ATT&CK framework. In our reviews, we are
limited by the information provided in the ATT&CK. We also assumed that no further tactics in the attack
lifecycle would be successful without initial access to the networks.
This section has three sub-sections. In the first subsection, we share our review of four techniques and five
sub-techniques of the APT29 group to gain "initial access" to networks. In the second subsection, we
summarize the principles and building blocks of zero trust architecture. In the third subsection, we evaluate
the effectiveness of zero trust in preventing APT techniques.
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3.1 APT Analysis
We limited our scope to the initial access tactic of APT29 because our focus is the prevention at the very
beginning of the threat lifecycle. If defenders succeed in thwarting APT actors at the initial access step, APTs
will not be able to step up to the forthcoming tactics. Specifically, 11 tactics in ATT&CK Enterprise Matrix that
come after the initial access are actions of the APT actors who completed the initial access. The two tactics
before the initial access are reconnaissance and resource development. The preventive countermeasures
associated with these tactics are within the scope of cyber deterrence and cyber diplomacy.
There are tools and methods, including zero trust, that can effectively prevent APT techniques associated with
the tactics after the initial access. However, our focus is to analyze the effectiveness of zero trust in preventing
APT activities without any network compromises.
Figure-1 shows the four techniques and five sub-techniques used by APT29 in initial access. Figure-1 is taken
from the ATT&CK Navigator page of APT29. The shaded techniques are the ones used by APT29.

Figure 1: Initial access techniques and sub-techniques of APT29
Respective countermeasures for these techniques are listed in Table-1. The countermeasures are extracted
from the ATT&CK webpage as well. The description of techniques and mitigations is not given in this article
because of the space constraints.
Table 1: Mitigations for APT29 techniques and sub-techniques
Technique/Sub-technique
T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application

Mitigation
1. Application Isolation and Sandboxing (1)
6
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
2.
3.
1.
2.

T1133: External Remote Services

T1199: Trusted Relationship
T1078: Valid Accounts

T1078.002: Domain Accounts

T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment

T1566.002: Spearphishing Link

T1566.003: Spearphishing via Service

T1195.002: Compromise Software Supply Chain

Exploit Protection (2)
Network Segmentation (3)
Privileged Account Management (4)
Update Software (5)
Vulnerability Scanning (6)
Disable or Remove Feature or Program (7)
Limit Access to Resource Over Network (8)
Multi-factor Authentication (9)
Network Segmentation (3)
Network Segmentation (3)
User Account Control (10)
Application Developer Guidance (11)
Password Policies (12)
Privileged Account Management (4)
User Training (13)
Multi-factor Authentication (9)
Privileged Account Management (4)
User Training (13)
Antivirus/antimalware (14)
Network Intrusion Prevention (15)
Restrict Web-based Content (16)
Software Configuration (17)
User Training (13)
Restrict Web-based Content (16)
Software Configuration (17)
User Training (13)
Antivirus/antimalware (14)
Restrict Web-based Content (16)
User Training (13)
Update Software (5)
Vulnerability Scanning (6)

After removing the duplicated mitigations from Table-1, we are left with 17 unique controls to compare with
Zero Trust. Note that numbers that uniquely identify controls are put next to each control in the second
column of Table-2.
3.2 Zero Trust Architecture
ZTA is not a straightforward solution; instead, it combines different kinds of technologies, methods, and
procedures. It involves people, processes, and technology. Successful implementation of ZTA requires a total
commitment from leadership (Chowdhury, 2019; NSA, 2021). It should also be aligned with business objectives
(Chowdhury, 2019). Every organization can adapt to ZTA differently depending on different organizational and
technological factors. In this section, we extracted seventeen components of ZTA by reviewing various
academic and industry resources (Modderkolk, 2018; Chowdhury, 2019; Rivas, 2019; Embrey, 2020; Rose et
al., 2020; Uttecht, 2020; Alevizos, Ta and Hashem Eiza, 2021; Banach, 2021; Buck et al., 2021; Checkpoint,
2021; Colortokens, 2021; Garbis and Chapman, 2021; Sanders et al., 2021; Splunk, 2021; Xiaojian et al., 2021;
VMware, 2022):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Centralized authentication of users, devices, and applications (accompanied by SSO and MFA)
Encryption
Continuous monitoring
Network segmentation
Application segmentation
Network access control
System access control
Traffic filtering
Application execution control
7

Bilge Karabacak and Todd Whittaker

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Operational and forensic analysis (Includes vulnerability scanning (Uttecht, 2020))
Policy enforcement
Configuration management
Data discovery, tracking, and analysis (Asset inventory)
User account management
Least privilege principle
Guidance and training of application developers
Training and awareness

ZTA uses the existing technologies; the differentiation of ZTA is how it brings these technologies together to
create a zero-trust mindset in organizations. Below is the list of fundamental tenets of zero trust as shared in
NIST SP 800-207. The above list of countermeasures might not help readers understand how ZTA is designed
and deployed. The implementation context for the seventeen items above is explained thoroughly in NIST SP
800-207.
3.3 Comparative Analysis of ATT&CK Mitigations and ZTA Components
This section compares two numbered lists of countermeasures in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The first list was the
mitigations suggested by MITRE ATT&CK to prevent APT29 initial access attempts. The second list was the list
of components of ZTA, composed after reviewing NIST SP 800-207 and several academic articles and industry
whitepapers. The controls in the two lists are matched in Table-2.
Table 2: Comparison of ATT&CK mitigations and ZTA components
Mitigation suggested by MITRE ATT&CK
(See Table-1)
Application Isolation and Sandboxing (1)
Exploit Protection (2)
Network Segmentation (3)
Privileged Account Management (4)
Update Software (5)
Vulnerability Scanning (6)
Disable or Remove Feature or Program (7)
Limit Access to Resource Over Network (8)
Multi-factor Authentication (9)
User Account Control (10)
Application Developer Guidance (11)
Password Policies (12)
User Training (13)
Antivirus/antimalware (14)
Network Intrusion Prevention (15)
Restrict Web-based Content (16)
Software Configuration (17)

Corresponding component of ZTA as suggested by NIST
SP 800-27, academia and/or industry (See the list in the
previous page)
Application segmentation (5)
Traffic filtering (8)
Network segmentation (4)
Least privilege principle (15)
Operational and forensic analysis (10)
Configuration management (12)
Operational and forensic analysis (10)
Application execution control (9)
Network access control (6)
System access control (7)
Centralized authentication of users, devices, and
applications (accompanied by SSO and MFA) (1)
User account management (14)
Least privilege principle (15)
Guidance and training of application developers (16)
Policy enforcement (11)
Training and awareness (17)
Application execution control (9)
Network access control (6)
Least privilege principle (15)
Configuration management (12)

All of the mitigations suggested by MITRE ATT&CK to prevent APT29 initial access have been matched by
technologies, methods, and procedures recommended for zero trust implementations by NIST SP 800-207,
academia, or industry.
NIST's SP 800-207 can be considered one of the principal resources in defining ZTA. It provides comprehensive
guidance for organizations that plan to switch to ZTA. However, Vulnerability Scanning, Application Developer
Guidance, and User Training have not been explicitly or strongly mentioned in NIST SP 800-207. Authors
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suggest that the future revision of NIST SP 800-207 should include these controls; even if they are not at the
core of zero trust, they are essential preventative controls.
Three ZTA components in the list don't match any mitigations suggested by MITRE ATT&CK to prevent the
APT29 threat actor. These components are (1) encryption, (2) continuous monitoring, and (3) data discovery,
tracking, and analysis (Asset inventory). It is an anticipated situation; because the authors reviewed a number
of academic and industry papers to extract ZTA components. It has been expected that the set of extracted
components will be more extensive than the set of mitigations suggested by MITRE ATT&CK.
4. Conclusion
Information security controls can be classified as preventive and detective controls; some are preventive and
detective, such as antivirus software. Prevention is ideal; however, detection is a must. As a matter of fact, one
hundred percent prevention is impossible, making absolute security an impossible task. Eventually, this reality
makes detection a mandatory process for organizations.
The two tactics of MITRE ATT&CK that come before “Initial Access” are “Reconnaissance” and “Resource
Development”. Cyber deterrence and cyber diplomacy might be effective in preventing Reconnaissance and
Resource Development. Both tactics are difficult to mitigate by organizations, though, because the prevention
methods for these tactics are implemented in a domain that is predominantly out of direct control of
organizations. Moreover, these prevention methods might not be as effective as the prevention methods of
Initial Access and subsequent tactics after the Initial Access. The detection of reconnaissance and resource
development can be accomplished by cyber threat intelligence services. It is an effective method frequently
used by organizations. Initial Access is the first tactic after Reconnaissance and Resource Development that an
organization has direct control on the mitigation steps to prevent the techniques under this tactic. Effective
prevention of Initial Access techniques is key to keeping the networks secure. In the SolarWinds breach, after
attackers succeeded in the initial attack, they progressed successfully in the subsequent tactics such as
Execution, Persistence, and Privilege Escalation.
Zero Trust Architecture is a promising approach to prevent Advanced Persistent Threats. There is a significant
overlap between MITRE ATT&CK controls to prevent Initial Access and ZTA components and principles
extracted from a diverse set of academic and industry papers. Merely focusing on detecting APTs has proven
insufficient, and prevention should be considered at a higher priority than it has been in the past. ZTA is a
structured way of accomplishing that goal.
ZTA can prevent the APT actors at the Initial Access and, therefore, improve the security significantly. In this
regard, the 2020 United States Federal Government Data Breach caused by SolarWinds Orion and other
vendor vulnerabilities could have been prevented if the attacked networks had used ZTA; in the worst case,
the harm caused by the attacks might be far less compared to the actual case.
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